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In this paper we address a frontier topic in the humanities, namely how the cultural and
natural construction that we call landscape affects well-being and health. Following an
updated review of evidence-based literature in the fields of medicine, psychology, and
architecture, we propose a new theoretical framework called “processual landscape,”
which is able to explain both the health-landscape and the medical agency-structure
binomial pairs. We provide a twofold analysis of landscape, from both the cultural
and naturalist points of view: in order to take into account its relationship with health,
the definition of landscape as a cultural product needs to be broadened through
naturalization, grounding it in the scientific domain. Landscape cannot be distinguished
from the ecological environment. For this reason, we naturalize the idea of landscape
through the notion of affordance and Gibson’s ecological psychology. In doing so,
we stress the role of agency in the theory of perception and the health-landscape
relationship. Since it is the result of continuous and co-creational interaction between
the cultural agent, the biological agent and the affordances offered to the landscape
perceiver, the processual landscape is, in our opinion, the most comprehensive
framework for explaining the health-landscape relationship. The consequences of our
framework are not only theoretical, but ethical also: insofar as health is greatly affected
by landscape, this construction represents something more than just part of our heritage
or a place to be preserved for the aesthetic pleasure it provides. Rather, we can talk
about the right to landscape as something intrinsically linked to the well-being of present
and future generations.
Keywords: affordance, agency, ecological psychology, health, landscape, naturalistic aesthetics, well-being,
perception
INTRODUCTION
It is common to hear that contact with nature, in its many and diverse forms, promotes human
health. But how are we to understand this connection? A recent Frontiers in Psychology article (Kuo,
2015) identifies several environmental factors, physiological and psychological states, behaviors or
conditions, each of which has been empirically tied to nature and has implications for specific
physical and mental health outcomes. It might be true that walking through the surrounding
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landscape, to name just an instance, has a positive or restorative
effect on health, but how can we understand the myriad of
studies and literature reviews on that topic? And if there
is a connection between nature and human health, what is
the theoretical framework in which we can understand this
hypothesis? To answer these questions, we have analyzed the
existing literature on the landscape-health relationship in order
to gain a comprehensive idea of the different research areas
currently being explored, and to discuss their implications.
There is, in fact, a large body of evidence attesting to
the role played by landscape in the treatment, recovery and
maintenance of human health. We analyze the majority of the
papers and theories that address this relationship from a medical,
psychological, and philosophical point of view. However, even
though some of the evidence-based papers suggest a theoretical
interpretation, they generally lack a comprehensive theory
capable of explaining the connection between human beings,
landscape and health.
For this reason, we hypothesize that a comprehensive
framework for explaining the health-landscape relationship could
be established by including the concepts of agency and affordance
in a new theory of landscape. We therefore propose a new notion
of landscape which combines both the cultural and naturalist
approaches, and as a result we introduce the idea of processual
landscape to explain both the health-landscape and the medical
agency-structure binomial pairs.
In introducing this new framework, we follow both a
naturalistic and cultural methodology. Human beings live
embedded in landscape and they perceive it through their whole
body; it affects their well-being. The common understanding
of landscape today is still the cultural one, which maintains a
delicate balance between aesthetics and cultural studies, history
and art theory. In this paper we provide a brief history of the
concept of landscape from a visual, perceptional, and cultural
point of view. However, in order to bridge the gap between social
and natural sciences in their approach to this concept, we take
a step forward in the naturalization of landscape. In order to
understand what landscape is and how it affects our health we
have to address biological and ecological theories of perception
of the environment.
Our hypothesis is that, thanks to ecological psychology and
the consequent theory of affordance, it is possible to naturalize
landscape by introducing ideas from the scientific domain into
a body of literature that has, for decades, remained exclusively
cultural. Human beings are an active part of the process of co-
creating landscape, both from a cultural and an ecological point
of view. Their life, body and perception (which here we ground
in the theory of affordance) cannot be detached from landscape.
Their mental and physical health depends and relies on it. This
agential dimension of the notion of processual landscape, we
argue, provides the missing connection with health and well-
being.
The paper is structured as follows: in section “Main
Theoretical Issues and Approaches” we review the main
theoretical issues and approaches to the debate on health and
landscape, and in section “Research Focused on Restorative
Environments” we analyze the psychological research on
restorative environments connected to stress reduction and
attention theories. In section “Evidence of the Health-Landscape
Relationship: Toward a New Definition of Health” we analyze
the medical evidence of the landscape-health relationship, the
social determinants of health (SDH) theory, and in doing so
we propose a new definition of health connected to agency.
In section “What is Landscape? The Cultural Approach and
Beyond” we provide a brief history of the cultural concept of
landscape from the visual and artistic points of view. In section “A
Step Toward Biology and Ecology: Naturalization of Landscape”
we broaden the definition of landscape to include biology and
ecology. In section “Ecology of Perception: a New Role for the
Perceiver” we naturalize the concept of landscape by taking into
consideration the role of the perceiver and the affordances offered
by landscape. In section “Processual Landscape: A Framework
Connecting Health and Landscape” we propose the theoretical
framework of processual landscape, which is able to explain and
ground the health-environment relationship through the twofold
idea of cultural and biological agency. We then conclude with a
recapitulation and some general remarks on the effectiveness of
the framework proposed and its ethical implications.
MAIN THEORETICAL ISSUES AND
APPROACHES
Many papers in contemporary literature analyze data series
related to how well-being could be effectively improved by
exposure to natural landscapes (see Coles and Millman, 2013).
From architecture and the humanities to medicine and ecology,
the evidence reported highlights the fact that well-being, health
and natural landscape are correlated. Below, we summarize some
of the main approaches found in the literature: psychological,
philosophical, medical and those based on social determinants.
We have divided this section into two parts: the first one
addresses research focused on restorative environments and their
connection with psychological and philosophical theories of
place. These studies, based on stress reduction and attachment to
place, were the first to illustrate the correlation between landscape
and health during the 1970 and 1980s. In the second section,
the analysis of the literature is focused on the concept of health,
and how over recent decades health and well-being have been
connected to landscape through medical evidence and studies on
their social determinants. By presenting these various theories,
we acknowledge their pioneering role in the debate while at the
same time pointing out that they lack a comprehensive theoretical
framework. The aim of this paper is to provide a new, broader
framework, which is both cultural and ecological.
Research Focused on Restorative
Environments
Psychology and philosophy stress the importance of the
relationship between health and landscape in different ways.
Psychology, for instance, addresses this issue through psycho-
evolutionary frameworks and the so-called ART theory, all
of which focus on stress reduction. Philosophy, on the other
hand, proposes a place-attachment approach which originates
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from phenomenology and human geography. One of the most
important theories of place-attachment is called topophilia, which
has nowadays been expanded to include the concept of biophilia.
All these theories demonstrate, from different points of view,
the intimate connection between our body, our health and the
landscape in which we live, or merely look at.
Stress Reduction (Theories of Evolution)
Psychophysiological theories of stress reduction (Ulrich, 1983;
Ulrich et al., 1991) have shown that being in a non-threatening
natural environment reduces the physical indicators connected
with stress, such as blood pressure, heart rate, serum cortisol,
and skin conductance (see also the studies connecting access
to green spaces and health in Ward Thompson et al., 2010,
2014; Ward Thompson, 2011; Curl et al., 2015). In these works,
stress is usually defined as the process by which individuals
respond psychologically, physiologically, and often behaviorally
to situations that challenge or threaten their well-being (Ulrich
et al., 1991, p. 202).
These theories played a pioneering role in the determination
of health by natural settings, yet can be called into question
from a theoretical point of view. Ulrich (1983) and Ulrich
et al. (1991), for instance, proposes a psycho-evolutionary
framework to explain the role of landscape in reducing stress,
based on the following elements: (1) response to natural setting
is basically unconscious and related to adaptive responses to
nature; (2) nature contact (even a simple view) can rapidly
evoke positive stress reduction effects; (3) the origin of the
response relies on the survival of the human species. According
to this framework, the color green (signifying, for example,
refuge) would be less stressful than red or yellow, which
signify fire (Ulrich et al., 1991; Ward Thompson, 2011, p. 193).
The reason for this preference is directly related to the
link between evolution and aesthetic response: nature helped
proto-humans to recover from acute stress and to prepare
them for the next survival task (see also Hartig et al., 2014,
p. 217). The psycho-evolutionary theory has the merit of
initiating the debate on the naturalization of landscape (see
Appleton, 1975; Dutton, 2006, 2009; Di Summa-Knoop, 2014),
yet it poses a number of problems. Firstly, an evolution-based
theory of stress reduction or landscape preference cannot be
demonstrated. Secondly, it risks relying on ad hoc hypotheses
to explain specific situations. And finally, such a strategy for
the naturalization of landscape often underestimates the role
of cultural and sociological elements in addressing the health-
landscape connection.
Attention Restoration Theory (Psychology)
The Experience of Nature (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989) examines
the qualities that characterize restorative environments, that is
to say, environments that help restore our attention. Irritability,
anxiety, stress, lack of perception, and lack of interest in human
beings have all been recognized as a direct consequence of
attention fatigue. Kaplan and Kaplan developed ART (Attention
Restoration Theory) on the basis that we can better concentrate
and restore our directed attention after experiencing nature,
since during that experience we are attracted by an involuntary
attention or fascination (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989; Kaplan, 1995;
Warber et al., 2013, p. 21).
Taking inspiration from Kaplan and Kaplan (1989, p. 178;
see also Kaplan, 1995, p. 178), James (1892) distinguish between
directed, effortless and restored attention. When our directed
attention needs to rest, “it is necessary to find some other basis
for maintaining one’s focus. What is needed is an alternative
mode of attending that would render the use of directed attention
temporarily unnecessary” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 172). The solution
lies in what James called “fascination,” and Kaplan and Kaplan
describe as “attention that requires no attention at all, such as
when something exciting or interesting happens and we look to
discover what is going on” (Kaplan and Kaplan, 1989, p. 179;
see also p. 184). The restorative experience is based on a series
of specific elements which, in addition to fascination, include
“being away” (Kaplan, 1995, p. 174) and a concept of “extent”
based on connectedness and scope, implying the sense of being
in a whole other world (Kaplan, 1995, p. 175; see also Kaplan and
Kaplan, 1989, p. 183). According to Kaplan and Kaplan (1989,
pp. 173, 180), natural environments fulfill some of these features:
not only do they reduce stress by eliminating directed attention
fatigue, they can also help to prevent it. This psychological
theory proposes a specific framework, focused on restoration
of attention and the involuntary role of fascination in human
mind. It is one of the most interesting studies explaining the link
between health and nature, even though it does not take explicitly
into account the cultural aspect of perception. The majority of
the research in environmental psychology follows either ART or
stress reduction theory, or both of them (Bratman et al., 2012,
p. 122). The main difference between the two relates to the
fact that the former is more focused on cognition, the latter on
evolutionary elements.
Emotional and Ontological Connection with Place
(Philosophy/Human Geography)
The majority of philosophical theories of landscape follow a
phenomenological approach (the main reference being Merleau-
Ponty, 1960, 1964) and are based on the idea that humans are
embedded in and determined by place with respect to their
cognitive/perceptional and emotional/political processes (Casey,
1993, 1997, 2002; Malpas, 2011). However, one of the most
important contributions to this debate came from the field of
human geography, when Tuan (1974, 1977) defined the concept
of place-attachment in terms of topophilia, i.e., humans’ affective
ties with their environment.
Topophilia (from the ancient Greek topos: place and philia:
love, attachment) means that human feelings, values and attitudes
toward the world are geographically “embedded,” implying
that experiencing places plays a fundamental role in our
development. Tuan was one of the first geographers to provide
an understanding of place as a product of perceptive and
cultural elements: place and perceiver are linked by values,
ethical commitments, and feelings. He also introduced the idea
that anonymous space is changed into articulated geography
through the actions and values of people. His distinction between
space and place and his genealogy of the concept of place have
become very important for many geographers, philosophers,
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and sociologists, as well as for cultural approaches to place in
general. His idea of topophilia has also been studied in connection
with well-being, meaning that individual preferences for specific
places and restorative environments are significantly associated
with quality of life (Ogunseitan, 2005; Ruan and Hogben, 2007).
Several other concepts – which can be considered variations
on the theme – such as sense of place, place-identity and place-
attachment, were developed from the concept of topophilia, and
analyzed through both experimental research and philosophical
works (Lewicka, 2011). Recently, the concept of topophilia has
reemerged in relation to biophilia. The latter notion is an
evolutionary term introduced by Wilson (1984) to refer to the
genetic/adaptive/evolutionary affiliation between human beings
and nature. The concept has been justified in terms of place-
attachment: “The biophilia hypothesis proposes the existence of
an ancestral adaptation, which drives us to appreciate natural
environmental conditions and the living world, that evolved
because such emotional drive would ultimately be beneficial for
survival and reproductive success” (Beery et al., 2015, p. 8842).
The attempt at linking topophilia and biophilia (Sampson, 2012;
Beery et al., 2015) relies on an idea of landscape grounded in
both cultural and biological-evolutionary concepts, with benefits
for human health and implications for landscape management.
The role of the concept of topophilia and its variations has been
widely recognized in the literature (Lewicka, 2011). Its recent
developments demonstrate also that there is a need to connect
cultural approaches to place-attachment with naturalized ones.
Evidence of the Health-Landscape
Relationship: Toward a New Definition of
Health
Over recent decades much evidence – mostly medical – of
the health-landscape relationship has been provided. The main
theory on which this evidence is based and toward which it
leads is known as SDH theory. In this section we analyze the
principal medical evidence reported, summarize SDH theory
and attempt to provide a new definition of health, based on
notions of both agency and landscape. The SDH approach is
quite interesting in that it defines a broader concept of health,
yet we feel that the other part of the process, i.e., landscape, is
missing. The idea of processual landscape aims to resolve this
problem.
The late 1990s and the early years of the new millennium
witnessed mounting evidence in support of the necessary
relationship between health (and well-being) and landscape. This
evidence prompts us to question the concepts of care, health and
place of care, as well as the role of the patient him or herself. In
other words, it prompts us to question the relationship between
medical structure and agency.
One of the first piece of evidence attesting to the landscape-
health relationship is the idea of therapeutic landscapes (Gesler,
1992, 1993; Williams, 2007), a term used in environmental
psychology and health geography to denote those restorative
places/spaces that provide treatment or healing or that, more
generally, restore, improve and maintain health and well-being
(Milligan and Bingley, 2007, p. 800). The idea of therapeutic
landscapes can apply to a wide variety of landscapes: from
the unique and specific ones to ordinary scenes. The category
encompasses national parks, local urban landscapes, gardens
(Milligan et al., 2005), social forestry and woodland (Ward
Thompson et al., 2004; Milligan and Bingley, 2007) and even
hospitals or asylums located in the countryside. Moreover, the
idea of therapeutic landscape implies the improvement of the
medical community, specifically in terms of the relationship
between health structure and agency (Gesler, 1992).
Recently, the concept of therapeutic landscapes has been
broadened to include some other symbolic terms referring to
place-attachment. However, despite its different meanings and
applications, the notion of therapeutic landscapes allows us to
question the idea that physical and mental health problems
are merely personal issues which should be addressed solely
through individual-based interventions (Wood et al., 2015). It
also adds a chapter to the nature/nurture debate and fosters
an awareness of the fact that environment and health are
necessarily interconnected or, more radically, that nature/nurture
is a false dichotomy, since “we hold that environmental and
cultural components of health care are inseparable” (Gesler, 1992,
p. 737).
Many other studies also present ample medical evidence
(both direct and indirect) of the health-landscape relationship.
These range from the aforementioned psychological and stress-
related studies (see section on Research Focused on Restorative
Environments), to ones connecting obesity and frequentation
of parks and those relating respiratory/cardio-vascular diseases
and green spaces in the prevention of or recovery from specific
health conditions (Frumkin, 2003; Keniger et al., 2013; Shanahan
et al., 2015). There is also a relevant debate about the dose of or
degree of exposure to green space/parks/landscape that we need
in everyday life to maintain and preserve our health (Barton and
Pretty, 2010; Shanahan et al., 2015, p. 477). The broader climate
change discussion includes an attempt to connect biodiversity
and medicine: the thesis advanced in this respect is that we need
to protect global biodiversity and landscapes because the majority
of the medicines we use come from natural resources (Butkus,
2015).
Thus, health practitioners and policymakers not only
recognize the impact of place and physical and social
environments on health and well-being (Hordyk et al., 2015),
they actively stress the role of landscape in the improvement of
health and call for nature-based health interventions (Shanahan
et al., 2015, p. 482).
All this evidence led to the drafting of the UN document
on Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH]
(2008) and World Conference on Social Determinants of Health
(2011) and to the SDH approach (Solar and Irwin, 2010), which
can be considered both further evidence of the relationship
between health and landscape and, better still, as the final
result of a decades-long struggle. SDH is the study of the full
set of conditions under which living takes place, and their
impact on health. Both the document and the consequent
approach link health to a number of elements, including (among
others) governance, environment, education, employment, social
security, food, housing, water, transport, and energy. Most
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importantly, the UN document calls for healthy places for
healthy people (Commission on Social Determinants of Health
[CSDH], 2008, chapter 6), stating that: “Where people live
affects their health and chances of leading flourishing lives”
(Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH], 2008,
p. 60) and “communities and neighborhoods that ensure access
to basic goods, that are socially cohesive, that are designed
to promote good physical and psychological wellbeing, and
that are protective of the natural environment are essential
for health equity” (Commission on Social Determinants of
Health [CSDH], 2008, p. 60). It is thanks to the UN document
on Commission on Social Determinants of Health [CSDH]
(2008) and World Conference on Social Determinants of Health
(2011) that we can provide a broader definition of health
and well-being. Health is thus considered as being socially
determined. However, in order to avoid falling into the trap
of environmental determinism (Blacksher and Lovasi, 2012),
it is necessary to specify the role played by the concept of
agency.
The common-sense meaning of health refers to the biological
realm and implies the absence of a pathological condition (both
physiological and psychological). Nevertheless, already in the
preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization
(1948), health is defined as a state of “complete physical, mental
and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease
or infirmity.” This definition was questioned and criticized
in many ways, for the absoluteness of the term “complete,”
as well as for the fact that in this definition people with
chronic diseases are considered definitively ill (Huber et al.,
2011, p. 1). To date, the concepts of health and disease have
been questioned by several philosophical approaches, including
naturalism/constructivism; instrumentalism and comparativism
(Murphy, 2015). Yet contemporary definitions of health are
focused on both the notion of agency (e.g., skills and adaptive
capacities), and on social-environmental determinants. Only
by combining these two elements is it possible to avoid the
opposition between “life chances and life choices” in determining
health (Blacksher and Lovasi, 2012, p. 173).
If we take agency into consideration, health should in fact
be “based on the resilience or capacity to cope and maintain
and restore one’s integrity, equilibrium, and sense of wellbeing”
(Huber et al., 2011, p. 2). Health connects to the strategies
of the agent/patient/human being, to their autonomy and
capacity to adapt and self-manage – physically, mentally and
socially (see also Nordenfelt, 2007; Sturmberg, 2013; Sturmberg
and Lanham, 2014). From this perspective, a definition which
integrates both agency and environment could be: “Health
is a state of wellbeing emergent from conducive interactions
between individuals’ potentials, life’s demands, and social and
environmental determinants” (Bircher and Kuruvilla, 2014,
p. 368). In this case, health and the space of the agent are
considered as inseparable concepts; accordingly, determinants of
health can thus be divided into: (1) individual, (2) social, and
(3) environmental. Health, therefore, “occurs when individuals
use their biologically given and personally acquired potentials to
manage the demands of life in a way that promotes well-being.
This process continues throughout life and is embedded within
related social and environmental determinants of health” (Bircher
and Kuruvilla, 2014, p. 369).
In this scenario, the pitfall of environmental determinism
is overcome by specifying and analyzing the culture and
perceptional preferences of the agent (Blacksher and Lovasi, 2012,
p. 174), their psychological history and, most importantly, their
landscape. Although the concept of SDH may risk appearing
somewhat vague and overly broad, the notion of landscape, on
the other hand (of which we offer both an ecological and cultural
definition), is an appropriate and specific tool for describing
the relationship between our body, our health, our well-being
and the space around us. We can reformulate the structure-
agency binomial pair into the landscape-perceiver one. We will
explain the rich concept of landscape in the following section,
before offering a definition of processual landscape which will
finally be used to comprehend the notion of health and propose
a theoretical framework to account for the health-landscape
relationship.
WHAT IS LANDSCAPE? THE CULTURAL
APPROACH AND BEYOND
In this section of the paper we provide a comprehensive
definition of landscape which connects both the cultural and
ecological dimensions. We consider it one of the key factors for
recognizing the role of landscape in determining well-being and
health.
When we talk about landscape several features are implied:
cultural, visual, artistic and, we hold, ecological and naturalist.
The following paragraphs aim to explain and connect all these
dimensions through the bridge concept of affordance. We also
demonstrate that landscape can be distinguished from other
similar concepts such as space, place and territory, due to
its perceptual implications and, in particular, its aesthetic and
therapeutic qualities. We live embedded in landscape and, as we
add, we perceive it through our whole body, and therefore it
affects our well-being. This is why we need a more comprehensive
definition of landscape.
During the last decades of the 20th century, the so-called
“spatial turn” (Gould, 1996; Warf and Arias, 2009) in human
sciences substantially increased the role of landscape theory
in philosophy, sociology, anthropology, human geography, and
geophilosophy (Menatti, 2011, 2013, 2014b, 2015a,b). Thanks to
pioneering contributions by a large number of scholars (Relph,
1976; Tuan, 1977; Berque, 1995; Roger, 1995; Casey, 1997;
Malpas, 2006), the current aesthetic meaning of landscape goes
beyond the modern idea of landscape as a view or postcard.
Landscape is thus considered a cultural product which refers to
every kind of place and space: “Landscape is an important part
of the quality of life for people everywhere: in urban areas and
in the countryside, in degraded areas as well as in areas of high
quality, in areas recognized as being of outstanding beauty as well
as everyday areas” (Council of Europe, 2000: Preamble).
Historically, one of the first cultural definitions of landscape
stems from the French philosophical tradition (Berque, 1995,
2006; Roger, 1995, 1997; Paquot and Younès, 2009; Bonnaud
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and Younès, 2014) and differs from a sociological interpretation
of the concept. Landscape is not just the idea we have
of it (what sociology calls “collective representation”), but
rather encompasses also the practical actions performed on
the environment in order to adapt the actual landscape to the
representations produced by society. In other words, landscape
implies at the same time both reality and the appearance of reality
(Berque, 1995, p. 16). This means that landscape can be defined
as something real, as constituted by actual objects (something out
there), but at the same time it can be described as an appearance,
insofar as it is a product of our way of seeing, depicting and
painting it.
It is important to specify, however, that before being cultural,
landscape was (and still is) considered something visual and
connected to the figurative arts. From an historical point of view,
the European notion of landscape was born within painting,
and only as a feature of the Western Modern age. The French
research tradition on landscape affirms that some societies of
past centuries were not landscape-aware, and the emergence of
the concept of landscape is a specific characteristic of Ancient
China – almost two thousand years ago – and Modern Western
Europe (Berque, 1995, 2008). For example, it is impossible to
find any reference to it in ancient societies, such as, for example,
Ancient Greek society, especially in philosophical and literary
sources.
The etymology of the term seems to confirm its visual
origin: the word “landscape” (landskap) first appears in European
languages in around the 15th century, in the Netherlands. The
suffix -scape (and then the verb “to shape”) designates something
showing, exhibiting or embodying a quality or a state. In the
16 and 17th centuries, “landscape” meant a picture representing
natural inland scenery (Pungetti, 1996). Thus the term appears in
literature after painters had already discovered it. This idea that
landscape is a portion of the Earth that can be viewed from one
spot is shared by several authors (Cosgrove, 1984–1997; Jackson,
1984; Cresswell, 2004).
The history of the emergence of landscape demonstrates that
it is a visual/pictorial/cultural concept, introduced in a certain
period of human history. It is a term that conveys a specific
meaning from an artistic point of view, but which also implies
a precise idea of space, embedded in a specific culture. If we
chart the history and development of the concept of landscape,
we see how, over recent decades, it has become synonymous
with “place,” involving characteristics such as identity, history and
memory1.
As Jackson (1984, pp. 3, 5, 8, 156) wrote in Discovering the
vernacular landscape, originally, the term did not even mean a
view, but rather a picture of it, “an artist interpretation.” Yet the
definition of landscape has evolved to become a complex entity
that is always synthetic: it is not a natural feature, but rather a
synthetic space, a human-made system of spaces superimposed
on the face of the land. And because that system is made by
the community and for the community, landscape is not fixed
once and for all; it is always subject to sudden or unpredictable
changes.
1See, for instance, the difference between place and no-place in Augé (1992).
Indeed, landscape (as a way of looking at the land) assumes
different meanings. Social and cultural elements are considered
integral to it, constituting a “discourse” through which social
groups frame themselves and their relationship with both the
territory and other social and political groups. “The landscape
idea represents a way of seeing – a way in which some Europeans
have represented to themselves and to others the world about
them and their relationship with it, and through which they have
commented on social relations. Landscape is a way of seeing that
has its own history, but a history that can be understood only
as a part of a wider history of economy and society” (Cosgrove,
1984–1997, p. 14).
The history of the concept of landscape moves forward from
the idea of vision (Shapiro, 2003), or artistic representation, to
landscape as a cultural product.
To date, the main definition of landscape remains the cultural
one, which strikes a balance between aesthetics and memory,
perception and place-attachment, history and no-places. The
majority of analyses are still indebted to the artistic/visual
definition. Nevertheless, the most important aspect (or perhaps
the aim) of the cultural definition of landscape is that it moves
beyond the postcard effect: the perception of landscape cannot be
considered something natural or naïve; rather, it depends on a
specific cultural disposition and education.
Recently, the Council of Europe (2000) has attempted to
provide an even more comprehensive definition of landscape,
incorporating steps toward defining the political and ethical
aspects of this concept. The ELC acknowledges that landscape is
not simply a view, but also a place with its own cultural and social
dimension (see also Howard, 2004, p. 425). Most importantly,
the Convention overcomes the previous aesthetic distinction
between beautiful and ugly places, between outstanding
landscapes and those simply not worth considering. Its main
innovation is the idea that everything is landscape: ugly areas
as well as beautiful ones, urban surroundings as well as rural
ones. According to the ELC, all landscapes contribute to
the formation of local culture, for good and for bad, and all
have an impact on human well-being and the consolidation
of European identity. Landscape is thus conceived as: “an
area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of
the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors”
(ELC: Chapter 1, General Provisions, Article 1. Definitions). Its
study and management requires both cultural and ecological
approaches. A landscape has its own specific identity, which
has to be safeguarded and protected, but at the same time it
requires cross-border cooperation at the local and regional levels
to prepare and implement joint landscape programs (Council of
Europe, 2000).
Although the ELC also includes elements that allow us to
consider landscape as a common good and even a human right,
this topic falls beyond the scope of this paper (see Egoz et al.,
2013; Menatti, 2015c). What we have attempted to provide in this
section is simply a brief history of the concept of landscape from
a visual, perceptional, and cultural point of view. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid the risk of separation and to bridge the gap between
social and natural sciences in their approach to this concept, we
believe it is necessary to take a step forward in the naturalization
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of landscape and make an original contribution. That is what we
will attempt to do in the next section.
A Step Toward Biology and Ecology:
Naturalization of Landscape
The next step in providing a broader account of landscape is its
naturalization2 in connection with ecology. This link with the
natural and behavioral sciences (biology, medicine, psychology,
and ecology) is still under-theorized. As of 11/11/2015, a search
in the Frontiers website with the keywords “landscape AND
psychology” provided 39 results, but only one of them was
relevant for the purposes of establishing a connection between
landscape and psychology in naturalistic terms (Lin et al., 2014).
There remains, in fact, a sharp separation between those who
study landscape as a physical environment and those who study
it as a social and cultural product. We, on the other hand, argue
that the study of landscape both as a cultural product and an
ecological process should be considered a priority, both for its
definition and for its management.
Two main questions are involved in this debate: (1) How do
we perceive landscape? (2) What actually is landscape? These
questions are intertwined and their answers have repercussions
for our health and should be analyzed in accordance with a
cultural/naturalist approach.
Some earlier arguments put forward as part of this debate
may prove clarifying in this respect. Some authors have
successfully tried to connect aesthetics and ecology (Bourassa,
1990; Naveh, 1991, 2005; Nassauer, 1995, 2011, 2012; Carlson,
2000). Specifically, these authors are architects and ecologists
who believe in a concept of landscape which broadens the
range of and possibilities for its management. Their thesis
is based on the acknowledgment that landscape is modeled
from the social interactions which produce new and always
adaptive aesthetic, cultural and ecological definitions. For
instance, Daniel (2001) argues that visual landscape quality
assessment (in the 21st century) is a product of the relationship
between different perspectives: expert and designer parameters,
sensory and perceptual parameters and cognitive constructs
(Daniel, 2001, p. 268). These three kinds of parameters reflect
(respectively) three definitions of landscape: landscape as a
view, as a culture-rich environment and as a portion of
territory considered the prerogative of ecologists, architects,
and other specialists. When we have to operate on/manage
landscape, all these aspects should be considered and merged
together. Yet it seems that, until now, ecological values and
socio-cultural paradigms have been opposed. Contrary to this
attitude, the goal of a new landscape management model
would be to successfully merge these two approaches, since
it could “better serve environmental managers and insure a
more effective representation of visual aesthetic quality in
2Naturalization concerns the relationship between science and philosophy, and
is based on the idea that philosophy needs to follow a scientific method and
rely on the resources and results of scientific investigation. The debate arouses in
epistemology (Quine, 1969), and has been developed for instance by recurring to
neuroscience in philosophy of mind (see Godfrey-Smith, 2003). The naturalization
of perception (of landscape) can involve evolutionary theory, theory of mind,
evolutionary psychology and, specifically for our purpose, ecological psychology.
management decision and policies” (Daniel, 2001, p. 278). “How
do we perceive landscape?” becomes the fundamental question.
The answer is always complex, but our ways of perceiving
landscape surely influence how we produce, create and dwell in
it.
Similarly, Nassauer (1995, p. 230), taking inspiration from
Jackson’s (1984) definition of landscape as a “synthesis,” proposes
closer collaboration between aesthetics and ecology in the field
of architecture and design: “The focus has been on landscape
structure, not on human behavior. A more functional perspective
quickly demonstrates that humans not only construct and
manage landscapes, they also look at them, and they made
decisions based upon what they see, and know and feel”
(Nassauer, 1995, p. 230; see also Gobster et al., 2007). The
perception of landscape thus assumes a pivotal role.
This brief excursus shows the effort which has been made by
ecologists and architects to consider the cultural and perceptional
side of landscape, while for their part, those working in the
humanities have attempted to ground landscape theory in biology
and evolution (as outlined in the previous sections). A pivotal
role in this debate has been played by aesthetic preferences,
i.e., how we choose a beautiful landscape, why we prefer one
landscape to another, and for our purpose, how a landscape could
be better or worse for our health and well-being. Naturalization
through evolution is one possible strategy. However, it risks
relying on ad hoc answers; for instance, drawing on Dewey’s
(1934) ideas, Appleton (1975) argues that the origin of aesthetic
values is to be found in natural evolution as understood by
the life sciences. Human evolution from hunters has provided
us with a preference for prospects and refuges which allow
us to “see without being seen.” The objects of our landscape,
whether seen directly or experienced through the medium
of the painting, are symbols of values developed throughout
centuries of biological evolution. Appleton analyses major forms
of art (including poetry and painting) in terms of being refuge-
dominant or prospect-dominant landscapes. His theory does
not exclude the idea of culture in the development of aesthetic
values, but connects cultural landscape theory with ecological and
ethological theses.
Appleton’s theory brings us to another core point of the
debate: the naturalization of art. In art theory (as well as
in the debate about our aesthetic preferences) there is major
opposition between culture-based theories of perception (see Di
Summa-Knoop, 2014, p. 193) and naturalist or neuroscientific
perspectives (Seeley, 2006; Brown et al., 2011; Prinz, 2011;
Chudoba and Wilkoszewska, 2015). The naturalization of art
implies that in perceiving and producing art we mostly follow
evolutionary and adaptive bases. Evolutionary psychology and
art theory based on sexual selection and genetic inheritance
share a transversal and inclusive concept of art, and they
argue that art has been present in all cultures. There is and
always has been art in all societies, because it allowed human
beings to survive and reproduce (Dutton, 2009, p. 64). With
respect to the perception of landscape, Dutton specifies that
“people in very different cultures around the world gravitate
toward the same general type of representation: a landscape
with trees and open areas, water, figures, and animals. More
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remarkable still was the fact that people across the globe preferred
landscapes of a fairly uniform type” (Dutton, 2009, p. 14).
By referring to Komar and Melamid’s studies and artwork
(Dutton, 2009, p. 15; Herrington, 2009, p. 23), which showed
a cross-cultural preference for the color blue in landscapes, as
well as for water and other features recently depicted in the
famous painting America’s most wanted3 (Wypijewski, 1999),
Dutton infers that landscape preferences are innate and are
the expression of natural atavism. He states, in fact, that
“This fundamental attraction to certain types of landscapes is
not socially constructed but present in human nature as an
inheritance from the Pleistocene, million years during which
modern human beings evolved. The industry has not conspired
to influence taste but rather caters preexisting, precalendrical
human preferences” (Dutton, 2009, p. 18). According to
this theory, the origin of landscape preference relies on a
combination of the aforementioned studies by Appleton (1975)
and evolutionary psychology as developed by Ulrich (1983)
and Kaplan (1987). Moreover, Dutton refers to the famous
savannah hypothesis on landscape tastes (Orians and Heerwagen,
1992; Falk and Balling, 2010), which is based on the idea
that, like the hominids in the African savannah, human beings
continue to prefer open, mildly flat landscapes (savannah-
like settings), with water directly in view and a clear way
both to avoid predators and to keep an eye on them. Dutton
emphasizes that this kind of explanation of landscape tastes
implies that the cultural background plays a minimal or null
role.
Yet the naturalization of art does not necessarily always
deny the role of culture and cultural background in aesthetic
appraisal. Naturalism generally implies an attempt to ground
its conclusions in empirical findings. Moreover, although many
neuroscientists and philosophers of art follow only psycho-
evolutionary theory, others argue that emotions, which play a
pivotal role in aesthetic appraisal, may be different in different
cultural settings (Prinz, 2011, pp. 71, 75).
Likewise, we exclude neither culture nor naturalization from
the determination of perception of landscape, and consequently
from its definition. On the contrary, we believe that a broader
and more comprehensive theory of landscape will prove a
key factor in explaining why there is such a close and far-
reaching relationship between health and landscape. If it is agreed
that cultural background may determine the psychological and
emotional well-being of the agent, then it is the naturalization of
landscape which is able to explain its connection with medically
understood health.
In the end, to naturalize landscape without denying its cultural
dimension, we need to focus on how we perceive it. Perception
entails both our role as “agent” (thus our cultural determination
in perceiving, and our mind and physical body moving in,
the landscape) and the idea of “structure,” i.e., our relationship
with the ecological environment in which we live. In order to
understand what landscape is and how it affects our health, we
have to address biological and ecological theories of perception
of the environment.
3http://awp.diaart.org/km/
The perception of landscape is a complex scheme insofar
as we participate in the construction of our environment. We
propose to firstly focus on the role of the agent and to consider
landscape as the product of a group of histories. To visualize
these histories, we have drawn up a simple diagram (Figure 1)
which will be further developed in our concept of a processual
landscape (Figure 2). As Figure 1 shows, landscape can be
analyzed as a product of cultural history (or “stories”), subjective
history and biological history. We take inspiration from Berque
(1995), according to whom different scales participate in the
construction of landscape through human perception. This
author also adds that landscape is a médiance (a medium)
between the material (objective) and the ideal (subjective; Berque,
2000).
The biological dimension – both the agent’s and the
landscape’s, both the perceiver’s and the structural- allows
us to introduce and clarify the relationship between health
and landscape. The biological dimension implies different
approaches: the evolutionary, the ecological and the embodiment
theory of knowledge and perception. The embodiment theory
of perception will be analyzed using Gibson’s theory4. While
the analysis of the cultural origin of landscape and its visual
dimension is now clear (see Introduction and Main Theoretical
Issues and Approaches), we have yet to demonstrate how the
concept of landscape could be naturalized through a theory
of perception. Even though naturalization has already been
attempted by both evolution-based and neurophysiology-based
approaches, the theory we favor when analyzing landscape
perception is J. Gibson’s ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979).
Our choice is motivated by the following reasons:
• To date, Gibson’s theory has proven effective in describing
perception according to a framework which is not merely
stimulus response based.
• It connects perception with the agent’s “here and now.” It
addresses the actions and the actual event of perceiving, rather
than focusing on the evolutionary history of the agent, which
might incur the risk of epiphenomenalism (Christensen and
Bickhard, 2002).
• It does not reduce perception to a merely neurophysiological
process.
• It is one of the few psychological theories which establish a
connection between ecology and psychology.
• Even though it is mostly focused on visual perception, the
motor perception interpretation overcomes this limitation and
introduces the idea of embodied perception of space.
• Gibson’s theory solves the problem of environmental
determinism thanks to the role played by the perceiver in their
relationship with the affordances (as we will explain in the next
section).
4Embodiment theory implies a wide range of frameworks. Even though we focus
here on landscape perception, we should not forget that embodiment theory
was first introduced by Varela et al. (1991) among others, and has recently been
developed by Di Paolo and De Jaegher (2015) with respect to theory of mind and
the production of knowledge.
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FIGURE 1 | Perception of landscape.
FIGURE 2 | Processual landscape.
ECOLOGY OF PERCEPTION: A NEW
ROLE FOR THE PERCEIVER
The expression “ecology of perception” was introduced by
Gibson (1966, 1979, p. 41) as an approach to visual perception
in which the latter is not reduced to the S/R dynamic between
stimulus and responses, but rather consists of the relationship
between the affordances of the environment and the perceiver,
in an interconnection in which the philosophical dichotomy
between subject and object becomes obsolete. By questioning the
classical idea of perception, we argue, Gibson questions the idea
of landscape as well.
Although the application of Gibson’s theory to landscape
studies is not new (Heft, 2010), it has mainly been done in
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the field of design and landscape architecture, rather than
in applied psychology or healthcare. But in both cases the
application implies nothing less than a change of paradigm.
According to Heft (2010), research into perception and aesthetics
in environmental psychology has long been dominated by a
concept of vision that can be traced at least as far back as
the Renaissance. In this old paradigm, vision is considered the
primary element in defining landscape and is conceptualized
as an image-capturing process (Heft, 2010, p. 10). Gibson’s
approach to perception is radically different from both this older
paradigm and the traditional cognitive science that accompanied
it (Escribano, 2012, p. 48–50). Classical ideas of perception (those
which are based on the stimulus as a retinal input) conceive
the perceiver as stationary, “positioned like a camera at a fixed
observation point. From this perspective, the perceiver is ‘at a
remove’ from the perceived, adopting the stance of a detached
spectator rather than that of an engaged agent” (Heft, 2010, p. 11).
Gibson, the other hand, introduces a new theory of perception by
asking what role perceiving plays in the everyday functioning of
an organism. Perceiving becomes a part of the ongoing processes
that make up the life of an organism, and is necessary to its
survival. Moreover, in this view, perceiving and acting are part of
the same process and are fundamental to sustaining life in nearly
all complex organisms: “Observation on living things reveals
that organisms are continually active, turning their head, moving
around while looking, as well as felling, sniffing, tasting [. . .]
Perceiving, and acting are intertwined. Indeed, separate terms
‘perception’ and ‘action’ can be somewhat misleading” (Heft,
2010, p. 14–15).
Gibson’s theory shows that there is not just one vision (only
one perceptive resultant), there is not only the aperture vision,
concerning the basic configuration of the object, as if we were
looking at something through a hole in a fence. Real vision also
concerns the free movement of the head (ambient vision) and the
free movement of the body (ambulatory vision). Looking around
and getting around do not fit into the standard idea of what visual
perception is and, according to Gibson (and to the experiments he
conducted on the optic ambient array rather than on fixed vision,
or “snapshot vision”), visual awareness is actually panoramic and
persists during long acts of locomotion.
Furthermore, the perceiver finds himself emplaced with a body
in an ecosystem. This is the fundamental step through which
it is possible to exit the “picture world” and enter the world of
ecosystems, of organisms and, in this specific context, we add, the
world as constituted by different landscapes. As Ingold puts it, we
perceive “not from a fixed point, but along what Gibson calls a
‘path of observation,’ a continuous itinerary of movement [. . .] if
perception is thus a function of movement then what we perceive
must, at least in part, depend on how we move. Locomotion, not
cognition, must be the starting point for the study of perceptual
activity” (Ingold, 2011, p. 46).
Ingold also points out an important connection: the idea
of a perceiver embedded in the world was developed from
a philosophical point of view by (Merleau-Ponty, 1945, 1960,
1964), and then pursued by Gibson’s theory from a psychological
perspective. There are differences between the two frameworks,
but they share a non-objectivist perspective of vision. Ingold
compares the way in which the French philosopher describes the
perception of the painter with the way in which Gibson analyses
our perception: “The painter’s relation to the world, Merleau-
Ponty writes, is not a simple ‘physical-optical’ one. That is, he
does not gaze upon a world that is finite and complete, and
proceeds to fashion a representation of it. Rather, the relation is
one of ‘continued birth’ – these are Merleau-Ponty’s very words –
as though at every moment the painter opened his eyes to the
world for the first time [. . .] His vision is not of things in a
world, but of things becoming things, and of the world becoming
a world” (Ingold, 2011, p. 27).
In addressing the problem of perception in opposition
to classical cognitivism and empiricism, Gibson developed a
non-representational idea of cognition that nevertheless occurs
directly through what he calls the “direct pick up of information”
(Gibson, 1979, p. 238), and which is embodied and integrated
in the environment. Gibson strongly argues against indirect
perception5 and claims that an organism directly perceives
meaning from the environment and that this happens at the level
of medium, surfaces, substances, and events that are relevant to
its life.
Affordances as the Possibilities Offered
to Living Organisms
In order to specify the moment of perception and exemplify the
relationship between perceiver and medium, Gibson introduces
the concept of affordance: in the flow of perception the human
perceiver directly picks up affordances. In elaborating this
concept, he is in debt to Gestalt psychology, specifically the
figure/ground relationship: elements are perceived as either
figures (distinct elements of focus) or ground (the background
or landscape on which the figures rest). It is in this context that
a series of illusions are usually presented as the basis of Gestalt
theory. They demonstrate how visual perception is determined
by a non-mediated reconstruction of the context of the stimuli.
For Gestalt theory, the meaning or the value of a thing seems
to be perceived just as immediately as its color. Actually, Gibson
follows one of the creators of Gestalt psychology, Koffka (1936),
when the latter says that “fruit says eat me; water says drink me;
thunder says fear me [...] the things in our environment tell us
what to do with them” (Koffka, 1936, pp. 7, 353).
What is an affordance, then? The first definition given by
Gibson is: “What the environment offers the animal, what it
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill [...] something that
5There is an important debate about the role played by direct picking up of
information or mental processes as bases of perception. Gibson’s idea of perceiving
excludes imagery and mental processes. On the other side, Neisser (1976, 1978),
while trying to bring together ecological and cognitive psychology, develops the
idea of perceptual cycle. This concept implies the fact that information picked up
through perception activates what he calls schemata, which in turn guide attention
and action leading to the search for additional information. Neisser (1978, p. 95)
introduces the term anticipation, meaning: “What people see depends on the
anticipations they develop, the perceptual explorations they carry out, and the
information they find available; in other words, on the perceptual cycle in which
they are engaged. Neisser’s idea of perceptional process is relevant in this context
as it can be considered very close to our concept of processual landscape. Namely,
what Neisser (1978, p. 92) calls “anticipation” in perceiving and in picking up
information and affordances could be related to the cultural/social background
belonging to the agent perceiving landscape (see also Milton, 2002, p. 42).
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refers to both environment and the animal in a way that no
existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal
and the environment” (Gibson, 1979, p. 127). Using this new
term, Gibson describes what environment affords to animals:
terrain, water, fire, objects, tools, and other animals. The crucial
point is to understand how the environment affords (that is, gives
the possibility of) perception and action. The composition and
the layout of surfaces constitute what they afford, and affordance
emerges only when different characteristics of individuals, such as
their physical dimensions and abilities, social needs and personal
intensions, are matched with the features of the environment.
According to a simplified interpretation of Gibson’s theory,
affordance is usually considered as a property of the natural
environment, offered to organisms in action. There is no shortage
of interpretations of Gibson’s work (e.g., Heft, 1989, 2001, 2010;
Turvey, 1992; Reed, 1996; Michaels, 2000, 2003; Stoffregen,
2000), some of which are related to design and ergonomics
(Norman, 1988; Xenakis and Arnellos, 2012). Affordances are
mostly considered properties or resources of the environment
that have significance for the animal’s behavior. However, the
definition of affordance is more complex, as it implies the
concept of relation: “Affordances are controversial perceptual
objects, composed of both subjective and objective components
that are formed from the direct perception of environmental
invariants that are of relevance to the individual. Instead of
perceiving an object environment, and then determining some
future action through hypothesis testing over a symbolic world
model, we directly perceive what the environment affords given
our own physical embodiment. It is then the fulfillment of these
affordances that enables us to sense and act in a continuous
environment” (Worgan and Moore, 2010, p. 331).
This relational character of affordances implies that they
are not properties of either the environment or the animal.
Affordances, Chemero (2003, p. 185) argues, are “relations
between particular aspects of animals and particular aspects
of situations.” So, first of all, affordance is neither a property,
an a-priori concept, nor a universal measure. It is something
unique for every animal and it belongs to (and emerges within)
the relationship between the environment and the perceiver.
Different layouts afford different behaviors for different animals,
with mechanically different encounters. The different ingredients
of the environment have different affordances for nutrition and
manufacture; different objects have different affordances for
manipulation. Also, human and non-human beings reciprocally
afford each other a complex set of interactions. Finally,
affordance is related to movement: through the affordances of
the environment, the body in movement perceives the main
invariants of said environment. This is important, since it means
that Gibson’s theory is related to ecological perception on the
basis of agency and the actions performed by an agent or
animal.
According to Mossio and Taraborelli (2008), Gibson shares
with other authors a sensorimotor approach to perception,
meaning that the coupling between motion and the senses is
the key to understanding perceptual phenomena: there is no
fixed perception such as the postcard view. Moreover, the role of
action is basically adaptive, meaning that “the animal perceives
affordances in the environment that allows them to attain specific
goals” (Mossio and Taraborelli, 2008, p. 1335).
Gibson (1979, p. 130) also points out that it is impossible to
separate the cultural environment from the natural one, as if
there were a world of mental products distinct from the world
of material ones: “There is only one world, however, diverse, and
all animals live in it, although we human animals have altered it to
suit ourselves.” Our hypothesis is that this concept of affordance
can be used to create a bridge between cultural landscape theory
and ecological thought, by introducing a naturalized approach
to landscape which takes into account the cultural dimension
of our environment. We could even associate landscape itself
with the affordances if provides (cf. Berque, 1995), i.e., the
perceptional characteristics that enactively emerge during the
interaction between the environment and the perceiver (for a
discussion of interaction affordances, see Worgan and Moore,
2010).
In the recent debate about affordance and perception,
Rietveld and Kiverstein (2014) reject the idea that affordances
are features of the environment or mechanical elements with
ergonomic possibilities. Instead, by drawing on Chemero’s
relational approach and other important contributions (Costall,
1999; Heft, 2001), they relate affordance to the specific skills
of a human or non-human animal. Rietveld and Kiverstein
(2014, p. 326) propose a new framework based on the idea that
affordance always involves the exercise of an ability in a specific
context: “We argue that the affordances the environment offers
are dependent on the abilities available in a particular ecological
niche.”
The main point of this approach is that every affordance
is related to specific skills and, in the case of human
beings, to sociocultural practices. For this reason, Rietveld and
Kiverstein introduce Wittgenstein’s concept of “forms of life” (see
Wittgenstein, 1993), by relating the idea of affordance to that
of normativity. Actually, when offering a definition of the term
“niche,” Gibson himself introduced the idea that each species of
animal has its own distinctive way of life: “The niche refers more
to how an animal lives than to where it lives” (Gibson, 1979,
p. 128; see also Chemero, 2003, p. 192; and Chemero, 2009).
Based on this quote, the authors imply that the environment may
offer “many ways of life” to different species of animal (Rietveld
and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 328).
Seen this way, affordances are located in the context of a
form of life. According to Rietveld and Kiverstein, affordances
are “possibilities for action the environment offers to a form
of life, and an ecological niche is a network of interrelated
affordances available in a particular form of life on the basis of
the abilities manifested in its practices – its stable ways of doing
things. An individual affordance is an aspect of such a niche”
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 330). Human beings embedded
in a landscape of affordances develop specific skills though their
capacity to distinguish what is correct, optimal, adequate or
inadequate. The authors call this type of normativity “situated
normativity,” thus reformulating Chemero’s relational character
of affordance: “Affordances are relations between aspects of a
material environment and abilities available in a form of life”
(Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014, pp. 332, 335).
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Concerning the cultural and biological aspects of affordances,
Rietveld and Kiverstein consider that the most important thing
is the practice in which an ability is embedded. Affordances have
an existence that is relative to a form of life. So do landscapes, we
might add; both are dependent on a specific form of life (niche)
and on the material environment which allows our sociocultural
practices: “First the existence of an affordance does not depend
on the active use by any particular member of a form of life.
Affordances as relational properties depend for their existence
both on aspects of the material environment and on the abilities
available in a form of life. Second, our practices themselves are
dependent on the opportunities for action offered by the material
environment, in particular on the causal properties of things we
put to use in the services of our projects and concerns” (Rietveld
and Kiverstein, 2014, p. 340).
PROCESSUAL LANDSCAPE: A
FRAMEWORK CONNECTING HEALTH
AND LANDSCAPE
We see the theory of affordance as fundamental to our proposal
of a landscape incorporating both naturalistic and ecological
features in our perception of the space around us. The theory
developed and described so far in this paper implies important
philosophical consequences. The factors described up to here
constitute the main pillars of a theoretical framework which we
call “processual landscape.” To briefly summarize the main points
which allow us to build up a comprehensive idea of landscape as
a process, it is necessary to consider (see Figure 2):
• The perceiver of landscape as a cultural agent. Cultural theory
considers landscape to be a cultural product, in which the
perceiver plays an important role in determining landscape
through their collective history, personal stories and, in short,
cultural background. The relationship between landscape and
the cultural perceiver is based on the recognition of cultural
invariants of landscape, which are considered important in
order to safeguard places and space. The cultural approach
analyses the emergence and history of the concept of landscape
from its pictorial and visual beginnings (in 15th century
Europe) right up to the evolution of a more contemporary
and comprehensive idea of a perceived landscape existing in
close relation with the life of its inhabitants. Contemporary
literature on landscape moves beyond the mere visual
definition of landscape to provide a more comprehensive view
in line with the Council of Europe (2000). Specifically, we
agree with the main contribution of the Convention: landscape
is not just outstanding places, but rather includes everyday
environments also.
• The perceiver of landscape as a biological agent. The perceiver
is also a body that moves in the landscape and is in motion
during perception (this is one of the main assumptions
of Gibson’s ecological perception). The idea of a perceiver
as a whole body originally stems from phenomenology, in
particular Merleau-Ponty. Here, however, we focus on the role
of the physical agent through ecological perception, which
introduces a more complex approach both in the theory of
perception and the definition of landscape. In this sense,
landscape becomes the embodied relationship between the
agent and the possibilities offered by the environment to
the living organism. Thanks to ecological psychology and
to the consequent theory of affordance, it is possible to
naturalize landscape and to introduce the contributions from
the scientific domain into a literature that has remained for
decades merely cultural. Thus, in this more comprehensive
perspective, landscape is not just the cultural product of our
society, but rather also the result of our ongoing encounter
with ecology and the physical realm, which has traditionally
been studied exclusively from the point of view of scientific
theories.
• Perception of landscape, according to this new theory, is
neither an exchange of information nor a simple stimulus-
response relationship. Rather, it is a continuous process of
construction, emerging from the mutual determination of
the agent (cultural and physical) and the structure (the
environment, the landscape and its manifestation as place and
space). Perception can be thus understood as a relationship
between the perceiver and the affordances, which are the
possibilities offered by the environment to the organism,
rather than as a mediated elaboration of stimuli. Affordance
(Gibson, 1979) allows perception, but also motion, life and
survival: it is therefore adaptive.
• Environment, culture and perception cannot be separated: the
framework presented here yields a relational approach which
moves beyond the classical distinction between organism and
nature. According to this view, affordances are relational
properties: they are the basic invariant in the construction of
the built environment and built landscapes. Some authors use
the term ‘world of life’ (from Wittgenstein), others Umwelt
(from Von Uexküll; see also Kull, 2001; Kull and Hoffmeyer,
2005); we have chosen to refer to them as processual landscape
in order to underline their dynamic dimension and the two-
way nature of the relationship linking the agent and the
environment.
• Landscape can be described as a cultural product, but also as
an ecological otherness. It is not a mere epistemological
construction by human beings. For this reason, the
relationship between ecology and aesthetics, humanities
and natural science, is crucial if we are to describe landscape
as a process of codetermination between the agent (the
perceiver) and the structure (the environment).
The notion of process is not new in the sociological and
philosophical analysis of place and landscape (Lefebvre, 1974; De
Certeau, 1984; Massey, 2005), yet the novelty and specificity of
the framework we propose here lies in the fact that it integrates
most of those elements concurring in the creation of landscape.
Our view accounts for the creation of landscape as an interaction
between human beings and nature (and its manifestation as place,
space, and landscape) that does not give rise to an opposition
between the two extremes or a preeminence of one over the
other. On the contrary, human beings are characterized as
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being embedded in the place, in nature and in landscape. In
our proposal, therefore, place is seen as a set of processes or
relationships, thus overcoming both the idea of a mere aesthetic
or visual landscape and the idea of a cultural/social landscape that
can be simply determined or fully constructed by people, as well
as avoiding the pitfall of environmental determinism.
Human beings and landscape are therefore considered as
involved in a mutual and dynamic relationship. By basing our
proposal on the theory of affordances we can state that perceiving
the environment (and consequently living in the landscape) is
not merely a question of perceiving a value-free physical object
to which a meaning is somehow added arbitrarily. Rather, it is
a process of perceiving/creating a value-rich ecological object.
There is no passive place out there: landscape is not fixed and
pre-given, but rather a dynamic ecological system, in which both
cultural and ecological elements play a constitutive role.
Landscape, we conclude, can be defined as processual: i.e., it is
both relational and dynamic. Its reality depends on the processes
of which it is made up, in the same way as the affordances
offered by the environment do not exist without interaction,
and yet do not commit us to a purely constructivist approach.
Rather, landscapes are the product of the dialectic between
culture and the affordances of a place. This relationship is not
captured by a realist framework; nor can it be conceived as a
constructivist determination. Rather, it is a process in continual
evolution, occurring in the interaction between the environment
(with the complexity of its affordances and invariants) and the
perceiver: a body in motion using its physical and cultural
agency (thought and language are also motions), in order to
establish a relationship with and a boundary for the environment.
A processual landscape is what continuously results from this
kind of ongoing dynamics, and it generates what we call places,
spaces and landscapes.
The integrative notion of processual landscape allows us to
take into consideration the connection with health and our well-
being on the basis of the simple, yet often under-theorized, idea
that we are perceiving organisms (cultural and biological agents)
in the environment. As showed in the diagram in Figure 2),
human agents are an active part of the process of co-creating
landscape, both from a cultural and naturalist point of view. Their
life, body and perception (grounded in the theory of affordance)
cannot be detached from landscape. Their mental and physical
health depends and relies on it.
The idea that emerges from this processual concept of
landscape, supported by Gibson’s ecological psychology,
constitutes the framework which allows us to connect health and
landscape. The place in which we live is a process interrelating
our body/mind and the nature of the environment, in whose
creation we are an active agent. Consequently, we cannot discuss
our health and well-being without mentioning, considering, and
implementing our landscape. In section on Research Focused
on Restorative Environments we state that health and the space
of the agent are considered inseparable concepts; accordingly,
the determinants of health can be divided into three categories:
(1) individual, (2) social, (3) environmental. We provided
a brief summary of the contemporary definitions of health
as a connecting agency and a set of social determinants. In
the analysis of social determinants, we consider landscape as
pivotal. Unfortunately, current accounts of landscape tend to
underestimate the agential dimension, and it is this shortcoming
that our framework aims to redress. We propose a way to address
the relationship between health and well-being not just through
the medical, sociological and psychological evidence produced
by decades of studies, but rather through a common factor in
the debate about health and therefore about landscape: agency.
The agential dimension of the processual landscape provides the
missing link with health and well-being.
The concept of agency, firstly developed by Anscombe (1957)
and Davidson (1963), currently presents various approaches
and different applications in philosophy, psychology, biology,
and cognitive sciences (Schlosser, 2015). But the relation
between agency and landscape is an unexplored philosophical
topic outside Gibson’s theory and the related literature: “The
perspective of ecological psychology begins with the recognition
of human agency in continuous, reciprocal interaction with the
everyday world” (Chawla and Heft, 2002, p. 214; see also Gibson,
1966, 1979; Heft and Chawla, 2006). It is thanks to Gibson,
and also to the philosophical phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty,
that in this paper the idea of agency can play a pivotal role for
the definition of both landscape and health. All human beings
involved in the perception of landscape and in its mutual creation
can be considered as agents; thus perceiving does not imply a
landscape as a collection of given data, but rather it involves
an actual experience and interaction (Hamlyn, 1978, p. 545).
The importance of the concept of processual landscape proposed
in this paper relies, in fact, on a theoretical framework which
has overcome the mental/aesthetical/imaginative production
of landscape and has introduced the movement of a body
acting in the space and which, while it perceives, creates
its own milieu. Specifically, within the process concurring to
the creation/perception of landscape, agency means physical
perception (we perceive through our body and its movements
in space) but it implies at the same time the social/cultural
creation of place. On the other side, the most recent theories
of health affirm that it is agency-based. As we have showed
in section “Evidence of the Health-Landscape Relationship:
Toward a New Definition of Health,” contemporary definitions
of health are focused on both the notion of agency (e.g.,
skills and adaptive capacities), and on social-environmental
determinants (Blacksher and Lovasi, 2012). For this reason, we
quoted definitions of health such as (1) “based on the resilience
or capacity to cope and maintain and restore one’s integrity,
equilibrium, and sense of wellbeing” (Huber et al., 2011, p. 2)
or (2) “health is a state of wellbeing emergent from conducive
interactions between individuals’ potentials, life’s demands, and
social and environmental determinants” (Bircher and Kuruvilla,
2014, p. 368), in order to demonstrate how health connects
to the strategies of the agent/patient/human being, to their
autonomy and capacity to adapt and self-manage – physically,
mentally, and socially. The very idea of our paper consists
thus in introducing the term agency in the theory of landscape
perception, by naturalizing landscape, even though we do not
eliminate the cultural approach to space and place, but rather
we broaden and complete it. Agency appears to be the bridging
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concept between landscape and health: an ecological approach to
landscape implies agency; on the other side, a systemic vision of
health involves agency.
The aim of this paper is not to produce an exhaustive theory of
perception and agency, but to show we become agents when we
perceive a landscape. This act is at the same time the result of our
cultural background and our direct (and mutual) apprehension
of affordances of a place. Every movement thorough which
the perception of landscape occurs is agential-based, but at the
same time it requires a specific cultural/psychological/emotional
background. This aspect, even though it might be controversial in
the realism-constructivism debate within Gibson’s theory (Heft
and Chawla, 2006), yet it is a theoretically central idea that
emerges from our account of processual landscape, that results
from the integration of two wide traditions on landscape studies:
the cultural and the ecological one6.
CONCLUSION: A NEW THEORETICAL
FOUNDATION FOR HEALTH AND
LANDSCAPE
To sum up, we offer a new definition of landscape as a “processual
landscape” capable of explaining why we exist in such a close
relationship with this concept. The relationship with landscape
based on the concept of culture and affordance (ecological
psychology) is the theoretical tool which allows us to understand
the bond between health and the environment.
After an overview of the literature on the health-landscape
relationship (from the psychological, medical and biological
points of view) we propose some fundamental theoretical steps:
• We analyze the cultural concept of landscape, showing that
landscape was conceived firstly as a view, then as a picture and
finally as a cultural product carrying values such as history,
identity and memory.
• We demonstrate that landscape, contrary to the majority of
the literature on the theme, cannot be distinguished from the
biological and ecological environment.
• We reformulate the notion of landscape by naturalizing it
through the concept of affordance and ecological psychology.
Here “affordance” means the possibilities that the environment
offers to an adaptive organism to enable it to survive and move
6We are aware that there are many unsolved problems in addressing agency: one
is surely its relationship with representational mental states, whether perception
is accounted for by the relation between agent and environment or requires
internal representations. Debate in philosophy of science and cognitive science
shows that agency is possible even without representational mental states, both in
human-being and generally in organisms (e.g., the notion of minimal agency and
its adaptive character in Barandiaran et al. (2009; see also Moreno and Mossio,
2015, p. 89). A related issue concerns whether the agent perceives in a direct
or mediated way, which is also an important topic in Gibson’s theory and its
interpretations (Chawla and Heft, 2002, p. 206; Heft and Chawla, 2006, p. 20;
Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014). In addition, the thesis that our perception and
esthetical judgment are agency-based has been recently supported by neurological
literature and recent neuroimaging experiments (Di Dio et al., 2016): evaluation of
artworks (depicting both human subjects and nature) involves the motor system as
actively engaged by the depicted representations.
around. This means that perception is not merely visual, but
rather involves our cultural and biological background also. At
the same time, while perceiving, the organism builds its own
landscape.
• We have chosen to follow Gibson because we believe that a
theory of affordance – and its contemporary interpretations –
solves the realism/constructivism opposition that emerges
when the concept of perception is analyzed. We demonstrate
that we perceive because we are organisms moving in a specific
landscape that we ourselves build (see also the idea of Umwelt).
For this reason, our perception and thus our life are connected
with landscape. We live in it because we are in a causal
relationship with it.
The theoretical framework proposed in this research article
implies an agent – an active role in perception – and an
environment, which we call “landscape.” In this process human
beings are both dependent and co-creators.
The concept of processual landscape is therefore
the theoretical demonstration of the health-landscape
relationship. We propose a framework potentially capable
of explaining the reason for our link with landscape. Thanks to
medical/psychological/sociological studies, there is nowadays
a large body of evidence demonstrating the health-landscape
relationship. In order to complete this picture, we need a
theoretical framework explaining how the perception of
landscape works. Perception is the key to explaining the casual
relationship which exists between us and our landscape.
We perceive landscape as we build it, and at the same time we
are in a co-determinant relationship with it.
This is the preliminary result of our research, which may
be completed by studying the practical consequences of our
framework. Insofar as health is greatly affected by landscape,
this construction represents something more than just part
of our heritage or a place to be preserved for the aesthetic
pleasure it provides. Rather, we can begin to talk about the
right to landscape (Egoz et al., 2013; Menatti, 2014a, 2015c) as
something intrinsically linked to the well-being of present and
future generations.
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